Ensuring Electoral Integrity: A Comprehensive Study of the Legal Framework and Independence of Zambia's Electoral Management Body

Authors

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.51867/AQSSR.2.1.11

Keywords:

Appointment Process, Budget Autonomy, EMB Independence, Institutional Design, Legal Framework, Security of Tenure

Abstract

This study investigates the importance of Electoral Management Body (EMB) independence in ensuring the integrity of democratic elections. The study adopted the case study research design and a mixed methods approach. Drawing on the ontological and epistemological perspectives, the study applied the positivist and interpretive paradigms. The positivist paradigm allowed for the collection of data through observation, which entailed the use of quantitative methods, whereas the interpretive paradigm focused on the comprehension of concepts to understand the key issues on EMB independence and the operating environment by utilizing qualitative methods. The study employed both qualitative and quantitative methodologies, including a comprehensive review of existing literature, legal documents, and electoral laws, as well as stakeholder interviews, to gather diverse perspectives on the EMB's operations and independence. The analysis employed both thematic and statistical techniques to synthesize findings and draw meaningful conclusions. The study design examines Zambia’s legal framework governing EMB functions, focusing on security of tenure, transparent appointment processes, budgetary autonomy, and institutional design and assesses particular areas within the legal framework that either support or undermine the autonomy of the EMB in Zambia. Although there are formal provisions to safeguard the autonomy of the EMB, the study reveals ongoing challenges, including executive interference in various aspects such as budgetary processes and appointments, which compromise the EMB’s credibility. The research also highlights a generational divide in stakeholder perceptions, with younger individuals showing more scepticism about the EMB’s impartiality. The results highlight the need for legal reforms to clarify the EMB’s autonomy, enhance transparency in appointments, reinforce protections against arbitrary removal, and improve financial independence. The study concludes that based on a mixed research analysis of the EMB independence in Zambia, there are significant challenges in maintaining the EMB's independence and findings suggests that despite existing legal provisions, practical autonomy remains compromised.  The study recommends strengthening the EMB's independence and effectiveness by enhancing its legal framework, decentralizing its structure, and improving transparency and accountability. Key recommendations include clarifying the EMB’s autonomous status in the Constitution, codifying guidelines for the Attorney General’s ability to overturn decisions, and creating a mechanism for judicial review. It also calls for fixed, non-renewable or staggered terms for commissioners, diminishing presidential power over appointments, and budgetary independence. These reforms are intended to improve the EMB’s impartiality, operational efficiency, and public confidence within the Zambian electoral process.

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Published

2025-02-19

How to Cite

Nshindano, K. P., & Mpundu, M. (2025). Ensuring Electoral Integrity: A Comprehensive Study of the Legal Framework and Independence of Zambia’s Electoral Management Body. African Quarterly Social Science Review, 2(1), 133-147. https://doi.org/10.51867/AQSSR.2.1.11

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