African Union's Institutional Innovations for Promoting Good Governance: A Focus on he African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM)

John-Paul Safunu Banchani; Sebastian Angzoorokuu Paalo; John Bosco Dramani; Daniel Dramani  Kipo-Sunyehzi; Abass Mohammed

doi:10.51867/AQSSR.2.3.6

Authors

John-Paul Safunu Banchani Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology, Kumasi, Ghana Author https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2799-3471
Sebastian Angzoorokuu Paalo Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology, Kumasi, Ghana Author https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4757-6149
John Bosco Dramani Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology, Kumasi, Ghana Author https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3640-2664
Daniel Dramani Kipo-Sunyehzi University of Ghana, Legon, Accra Ghana Author https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3697-3333
Abass Mohammed Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology, Kumasi, Ghana Author

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.51867/AQSSR.2.3.6

Keywords:

African Union, APRM, Decision-Making, Delegation, Governance, Institutions, Peer Reviews

Abstract

The African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) is an instrument to monitor and evaluate African states’ economic management, political, socio-economic, and corporate governance. The review mechanism is established against the relevance of institutionalising good governance in Africa. Within the governance structure of the APRM, substantial decision-making authority is delegated to the APR Panel and other bodies. This presents a puzzle for international relations theory in that the APR Panel has exhibited significant independence from member governments over the years. Using a principal-agent (P-A) theory of international organisations, this paper interrogates the rationale for the delegation of decision-making authority to sub-bodies in the governance system of the APRM. The paper adopts a qualitative approach using an extended literature review and primary documents from the APRM secretariat and advances an argument that member states decision to delegate decision-making authority to various bodies in the APRM structure empowers agents with the capacity to make decisions devoid of any contestations from member states, which results from the differentiation of functions among the organs of the APRM governance structure. The central finding is that while the differentiation of functions in the APRM governance structure leads to a rule-based decision-making process, the APRM process still suffers from a lack of political commitment from member states participating in the process. The study recommends more engagement of African citizens about the importance of the APRM and its potential to enhance governance processes among member states.

Author Biographies

John-Paul Safunu Banchani, Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology, Kumasi, Ghana

Lecturer, Department of History and Political Studies, Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology, Kumasi Ghana
Sebastian Angzoorokuu Paalo, Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology, Kumasi, Ghana

Lecturer, Department of History and Political Studies
John Bosco Dramani , Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology, Kumasi, Ghana

Senior Lecturer, Department of Economics
Daniel Dramani Kipo-Sunyehzi, University of Ghana, Legon, Accra Ghana

Associate Professor, Legon Centre for International Affairs

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